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Using a fixed effect multivariate panel logit econometric model and taking possible 
endogenity problem into account, we test the hypothesis that foreign bank participation 
contributes to decrease in banking crises in transition economies in 1990-2006. The results 
suggest that foreign bank participation decreases the possibility of banking crises, 
controlling for other factors that may cause banking crises. This paper contributes to the 
literature by presenting the first empirical evidence on the negative relationship between the 
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Banking crises have proliferated throughout the world in recent decades as 
documented by the comprehensive studies of Caprio and Klingebeil (1996 and 2003), 
Lindergen, Garcia and Saal (1996), Dizoebek and Pazarbasioglu (1997), Demirguc and 
Detragiache (1998), Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), Demirguc-Kunt and Kane (2002), and 
Laeven and Fabian (2008). Lindergen, Garcia and Saal (1996) report that 133 of 181 IMF 
members had experienced noteworthy banking distress over the period of 1980-1996. 
Demirguc-Kunt and Kane (2002) document 112 incidences of systemic crises in 93 countries 
and 51 incidences of borderline crisis in 46 countries. Caprio and Klingebeil (2003) identify 
77 financial crises episodes have taken place in 72 developing countries since the mid-
1990’s. Laeven and Fabian (2008) report 42 systemic banking crises from 37 countries for 
the period 1970 to 2007. 
Acquisition and ownership of banks by foreigners in emerging markets have also 
increased significantly in the last decade. This trend has been more dramatic for Eastern 
Europe and Latin America than for East Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. In most countries 
in Latin America and Eastern Europe, foreign controlled banks at present dominate the 
banking system, controlling more than 50 percent of total banking assets. Foreigners on 
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average control more than 80 percent of total banking assets in sixteen transition economies 
in Central and Eastern Europe. 
Greater foreign bank participation may be associated with a reduced probability of 
banking crises. However, theoretical relationship between foreign bank participation and 
banking crises is ambiguous.  On the one hand, the presence of foreign banks may enhance 
financial stability through promoting the stability of the domestic deposit base, making 
banking system more robust to adverse domestic or external shocks, stabilizing credit supply 
during a negative shock, improving prudential supervision and regulation of the domestic 
financial system, and enhancing the transparency in the banking sector and efficiency of the 
macroeconomic policies. On the other hand, foreign banks can bring financial instability 
through stimulating capital flight and importing shocks from their home countries or from 
other countries where they operate. 
There is a possibility of reverse causality between foreign bank participation and 
banking crises. In some countries, foreign banks enter the host country following financial 
crises. In the aftermath of banking crises, banking authorities in the host countries reduce 
entry restriction to recapitalize their banking sector. Foreign banks viewed this sort of 
policies as opportunities to acquire domestic banks or expand their existing subsidiaries. 
 
At the empirical level, there are two main cross-country studies on the impact of 
foreign bank participation on banking crises in developing countries. Using time series cross 
country data over the 1988-1995 time period, Demirguc-Kunt et al. (1999) find that increase 
in the number of foreign banks is negatively associated with the incidence of banking system 
fragility. However, 
1) This study ignores the potential endogeneity of foreign bank participation, i.e. reverse 
causality between foreign bank participation and crisis. 
2) They use FOREIGN ASSET (The ratio of foreign bank assets to bank assets in the 
economy) and FOREIGN BANKS (The number of foreign bank divided by the total number 
of banks in the economy) variables to study the effect of foreign bank participation on the 
likelihood of banking crises. In their study, the coefficient on the FOREIGN ASSET variable 
is statistically insignificant while the coefficient on the FOREIGN BANKS variable is 
negatively and significantly correlated with the likelihood of experiencing a banking crisis. 
Thus, their results suggest that foreign banks reduce domestic bank fragility as they enter the 
economy rather than as they banks gain market share. 
3) Their sample includes 5 transition economies. None of transition countries in their sample 
had experienced banking crisis during the estimation period. 
Using cross-country data, Bart et al. (2002) find that the likelihood of a major banking 
crisis is positively associated with greater limitations on foreign-bank participation 
(Limitations on Foreign Bank Entry/Ownership). Consistent with Demirguç-Kunt et al. 
(1999), they find that the actual level of foreign bank presence (or foreign bank 
concentration) and foreign-bank ownership per se is not critically linked to the likelihood of a 
crisis. However, 
1) Their banking crises study ignores the potential endogeneity of foreign bank participation. 
2) Their banking crisis data is taken from Caprio-Klingebiel (1999); however the regulatory 
and supervisory variables including foreign bank participation variables are measured over 
the 1998-2000 period. Thus, as they state in their paper, their crises regressions should be 
interpreted in an especially circumspect manner.  
3) Their sample for banking crises regressions includes 40 countries. Their sample does not 
include any transition economies and banking crises in transition economies. 
4) They use Limitations on Foreign Bank Entry/Ownership and Entry into Banking 
Requirements variables to study the link between banking crises and foreign bank 
participation. Limitations on Foreign Bank Entry/Ownership variable takes the value of 1 if 
there are any limitations or restrictions placed on the ownership of domestic banks by foreign 
banks and there are any limitations placed on the ability of foreign banks to enter the 
domestic banking industry and takes the value of 0 otherwise. Entry into Banking 
Requirements variable measures the specific legal requirements for obtaining a license to 
operate as a bank. 
Unlike the studies mentioned above, our paper takes the potential endogeneity of 
foreign bank participation (reverse causality between foreign bank participation and crisis) 
into account. Therefore, we used one period lagged values of foreign bank participation to 
account for any possible endogeneity problem. Contrary to Demirguç-Kunt et al. (1999) and 
Bart et al. (2002), we find that the actual level of foreign bank presence (or foreign bank 
concentration) is significantly linked to the likelihood of a crisis by using a fixed effect 
multivariate logit econometric model and panel data between 1990 and 2006. 
None of the limited number of studies on the relationship between foreign bank 
participation and banking crises focuses on transition economies separately. The case of 
transition countries needs to be analyzed separately since the initial conditions in these 
countries are different from developed and developing countries. First, these countries started 
their privatization process with high levels of state ownership. Most of the entry of foreign 
banks has resulted from the privatization of state-owned banks. Second, private sector was 
absent or negligible when privatization process began. Third, privatizations were 
implemented around the same time. Finally, economic designs of the transition policies were 
the same. Hence, empirically verifying the existence of the relationship between foreign bank 
participation and banking crises in transition economies requires a separate analysis. 
In present study, we explore the impact of foreign bank participation on banking 
crises in transition countries. Using fixed effect multivariate models and taking endogeneity 
problem into account, we found highly statistically significant negative relationship between 
foreign bank participation and banking crises across transition economies between 1990 and 
2006. This paper contributes to the literature by presenting the first empirical evidence on the 
negative relationship between the actual level of foreign bank presence (or foreign bank 
concentration) and banking crises for transition countries. 
The paper is organized as follows. In the next two sections, we analyze the pros and 
cons of foreign bank participation in terms of its impact on financial stability. We provide 
data and methodology in section 4. In section 5, we report and discuss estimation results. 
Finally, we conclude in section 6. 
 
II. FOREIGN BANK PARTICIPATION AND FINANCIAL STABILITY 
 
The presence of foreign banks may enhance financial stability through promoting the 
stability of the domestic deposit base,  making banking systems more robust to adverse 
domestic or external shocks, stabilizing credit supply during a negative shock,  improving 
prudential supervision and regulation of the domestic financial system, and enhancing the 
transparency in the banking sector  and efficiency of the macroeconomic policies. 
1) The presence of well-capitalized foreign banks can promote the stability of the 
domestic deposit base during banking crises in the host country. A bank run is the most 
disruptive if it takes the form of flight to currency, i.e. people hold their money in cash 
outside the banking system or they remove their foreign exchange funds from the country. In 
the case of anticipated trouble in the financial system, depositors in emerging markets often 
engage in capital flight. They not only try to buy foreign exchange with their domestic 
currency funds but also keep their funds out of the banking system. This causes stress on 
foreign exchange rates and the liquidity of domestic banks. Depositors generally perceive 
foreign banks more safer than domestic banks since foreign banks have external support of 
parent bank.  At the presence of foreign banks, depositors may reshuffle their deposits from 
domestic banks to foreign banks instead of engaging in flight to currency or capital flight. As 
long as the foreign bank branches and subsidiaries do not have different reserve ratios than 
domestic banks, reshuffling deposits from domestic banks to foreign banks will not change 
aggregate bank deposits, reserves or the money supply. Thus, this behavior of depositors may 
stabilize aggregate deposits during economic distress. 
In their IMF mission to Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand and Korea after the 
Asian financial crises, Domac and Ferri (1999) observed that depositors transferred their 
funds from small and local domestic banks to large and nationwide domestic private and state 
owned banks, and from domestic banks to foreign banks. In all the countries under 
observation, foreign banks benefited from “the flight to quality” by depositors, and they 
increased their market share considerably. Similarly the IMF (2000, 42) reports that “rumors 
of financial difficulties at Postabank - the second largest retail bank in Hungary - led to a run 
by depositors that benefited in part foreign institutions”. The expansion of foreign banks’ 
presence in Argentina coincided with the phenomenon of the deposit base stability during the 
subsequent Asian, Russian, and Brazilian crises of late 1990s. Noting that “during more 
recent crises, deposits remained remarkably stable”, Mathison and Roldos (2001, 42) attribute 
the greater stability of the deposit base to growing share of foreign banks in the Argentine 
financial system. Large presence of foreign banks in Pacific Islands (Fiji, Nauru, Papua New 
Guinea, the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu) and Jamaica have stabilized the domestic deposit 
base during banking crises (Tschoegl, 2003). 
2) The presence of foreign banks can make banking systems of host countries more 
robust to adverse domestic or external shocks. Because international foreign banks have 
internationally diversified portfolios and only some part of their asset portfolio includes the 
local market exposure, they will be less affected by the host country-specific adverse shocks. 
Also, the branches and subsidiaries of large international banks usually have access to 
additional liquidity, foreign exchange and capital from their parents abroad in case of 
financial crises or difficulties. 
Many developing countries have dollarized their financial markets in order to 
integrate themselves with international capital markets through liberalizing their capital 
accounts and financial markets. However, during financial crises, governments of those 
countries often found themselves lacking enough international reserves to function as a lender 
of last resort because a central bank cannot perform as a lender of last resort in a currency 
other than its own currency. During the crises, domestic banks in many emerging markets lost 
their access to international capital markets. Most of the domestic banks were not able to roll 
over their outstanding debt. The ones, who were able to renew their credit lines, had to 
commit very high interest rates. Because foreign international banks have better access to 
international financial markets and foreign exchange than domestic banks, the presence of 
subsidiaries and branches of international foreign banks may ease this problem by 
transferring liquidity at low rates into the host country in times of economic distress. By 
analyzing the responses of domestic banks and subsidiaries of foreign banks in the case of 
financial distress in Mexico during the period from December of 1997 to November of 1999, 
Reynoso (2002, p.26) concludes that subsidiaries of foreign banks have a better access to 
funding in foreign exchange in times of stress when there are weak domestic banks.  
3) Foreign banks may contribute to greater stability of credit during the periods of 
crisis in the host country. Because foreign banks have better access to external funding 
sources they may be more stable lenders than domestic banks during a negative shock in the 
host country. 
Examining the behavior of foreign and domestic banks in Latin American countries 
during crisis periods, Dages et al. (2000) and Cyrstal et al. (2002) find that foreign banks on 
average exhibited higher and more stable credit growth than domestic banks. Martinez Peria 
et al. (2005) find that foreign banks did not contract their credit supply during crisis in the 
host country. Detragiache and Gupta (2006) find no evidence that foreign banks abandoned 
the host country during the 1997-98 Asian crisis in Malaysia. De Haas and Van Lelyveld 
(2006) find evidence that while domestic banks contracted their credit supply, greenfield 
foreign banks did not reduce their credit supply during crisis periods in ten Central and 
Eastern Europe countries. 
4) The presence of branches and subsidiaries of healthy international banks belonging 
to well-regulated financial systems can also improve prudential supervision and regulation of 
the host country. This is so since branches are not only supervised by supervisory authority of 
the host country, but also they are supervised on a consolidated basis with the parent bank by 
the home country’s supervisory authority according to principles of the Basel committee on 
bank supervision. Because activities of the branches and subsidiaries of international banks 
are also supervised by the headquarters or supervisory authorities of the parent bank, they 
will bring internationally accepted disclosure, accounting, and auditing standards. As foreign 
banks transfer  their risk management practices and internal control systems to domestic 
banks, the stability of financial system in the host country will improve. Analyzing the effects 
of foreign bank entry by evaluating the financial conditions and performance of foreign and 
domestic banks in seven Latin American countries over the 1995-2000 period Crystal et al. 
(2002) conclude that foreign banks on average sustained higher average risk-based capital 
ratios, followed a more aggressive provision policy against bad loans, and had better loan 
recovery rates reflecting their stricter loan classification standards and practices.  
5) A strong presence of foreign banks can enhance the transparency in the banking 
sector and efficiency of the macroeconomic policies followed by the countries with weak 
domestic banking system and fiscal institutions.  This in turn may reduce the probability of 
self-fulfilling currency crises and costly government rescue operations. 
In emerging market economies and transition economies, it has been observed that 
domestic banks, whether owned by the private or government sector, are under heavy 
government pressure to lend directly or indirectly to the government. Since the wealth is also 
concentrated, there are also some special interest politics between banks and politicians. It is 
often the case that large banks with large bad debts are bailed out by the government since 
they are considered to be too big to fail. Lack of transparency in the regulatory and 
supervisory system allows these banks to hide and accumulate these large bad debts until they 
become real problem. In general, demands for bailing out coincide with the economic crises 
when the government most needs funds. Thus countries with weak financial systems tend to 
accumulate more public debt because the government has to bail out banks. Governments 
often finance this bail-out through higher taxes and inflation (i.e., by printing money), 
causing a welfare loss to the society. This in turn can result in a self-fulfilling speculative 
attack on domestic currency by inducing people to expect that government have to abandon 
its stabilization policy.  
Foreign ownership of formerly government-owned banks and family-owned banks 
may reduce the likelihood of banking crisis. By privatizing government-owned banks, the 
governments in Czech Republic and Hungary removed them from their own direct control 
(Tschoegl, 2003). This brings a change in lending policy, risk management, and competition. 
Because a foreign bank knows that it is hard for the government to convince the public to bail 
out a foreign bank, it will be more cautious in its loan policy and credit risk underwriting. 
Thus, as the number of joint ventures with foreign banks increase in a domestic economy, 
one can expect a smaller shock to public debt generated by the banking system.  
 
III. FOREIGN BANK PARTICIPATION AND FINANCIAL INSTABILITY 
 
Foreing banks can bring financial instability through stimulating capital flight and  
importing shocks from their home countries or from other countries where they operate. 
1) Foreign banks may facilitate financial instability when faced with problems in the 
host country. Because foreign banks have more alternative investment opportunities outside 
the particular host country, foreign banks may be more sensitive to adverse conditions in the 
host country. When host country conditions worsen, the funds of foreign banks can be 
reallocated outside the host country to seek external investment opportunities. In the extreme 
case, they may abandon the host country during the crisis. 
While North American and European banks shifted their lending from Asia to Latin 
America and Europe during the Asian crisis, they reduced their holdings in all three regions 
during the Russian crisis (Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 2003). Examining the behavior of 
foreign banks in the US and other countries, Morgan and Strahan (2004) find that there is a 
positive association between foreign bank presence and business volatility. During Argentine 
crisis in 2001, Scotia Bank of Canada, Credit Agricole of France and Intesa of Italy refused to 
pump in more capital and walked away from their subsidiaries (Galindo et al., 2005; 
Tschoegl, 2003). 
2) Foreign banks may also import shocks from their home countries or from other 
countries where they operate. In the extreme situation, foreign banks may abandon the host 
country when faced problems caused by their home country’s economic conditions.  
If the parent bank’s financial condition is unhealthy, capital constrained parent bank 
may reduce activities of subsidiaries and allocate less capital to its foreign subsidiaries. On 
the other hand financially healthy parent banks may react in an opposite way. Financially 
healthy parent banks may expand their activities abroad when economic conditions in home 
country worsen and reduce their activities abroad when economic conditions in home country 
improves (Moshirian, 2001; De Haas and Van Lelyveld, 2006). 
Peek and Rosengren (2000) report that subsidiaries of Japanese banks in the U.S. cut 
back lending in the U.S. during the banking crisis in Japan. This negatively affected 
construction and real estate sectors in the U.S. By analyzing the U.S. bank lending to 
emerging markets, Goldberg (2001) and Palmer (2000) conclude that the U.S. bank exposure 
to emerging markets are correlated with the U.S. economic conditions rather than economic 
fluctuations in the host countries. Jeanneau and Micu (2002) find that credit supply to 
emerging  countries is positively correlated with the economic conditions in the major 
industrial countries. Examining foreign and domestic banks in ten Central and Eastern 
Europe, De Haas and Van Lelyveld (2006) find evidence that there is a significant negative 
relationship between home country economic growth and host country credit by greenfields. 
Martinez Peria et al. (2005) find that while Japanese banks reduce their lending to Latin 
America when economic conditions in their home countries worsened, other foreign banks 
increase their lending to Latin America when home country’s economic conditions worsened. 
 
IV. EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
In order to identify the determinants of banking crises in transition economies, the probability 
of banking crises is estimated as a function of a set of explanatory variables identified by the 
empirical literature as useful indicators of a bank’s failure (macroeconomic factors, financial 
factors, and institutional factors) by using a logit model in an unbalanced panel data context. 
The period under study is between 1990 and 2006. Our sample includes 26 transition 
economies.  We estimate the following fixed effect logit model specifications: 
 
where with its the largest presentation: 
 
 when a banking crisis takes place in i-th country at time t, otherwise .  
represents country specific effect for i-th country.  
The theoretical and empirical literature has identified a vast array of variables 
potentially associated with banking crisis. The variables used in our analysis were chosen in 
light of the theory on the determinants of banking crises, previous studies found in the 
literature, country specific factors, and the availability of data. The explanatory variables 
capturing macroeconomic factors, bank specific factors, external factors and institutional 
factors are defined below. Definitions and sources of variables are given in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 
Description of the Explanatory Variables and Sources 
Variable Name Definition Source 
GROWTH Rate of Growth of Real GDP IFS where available. 
Otherwise WDI 
INFLATION Rate of Change of the GNP Deflator IFS 
INTEREST  Real interest rate: Nominal Interest Rate 
minus the Contemporaneous Rate of Inflation 
IFS, WDI 
DEPRECIATION Rate Of Depreciation of Local Currency 
Against the US Dollar 
IFS 
SURPLUS/GDP Ratio of Central Government Budget Surplus 
to GDP 
IFS 
CASH/BANK Ratio of Bank Liquid Reserves to Bank Assets IFS 
M2/RESERVES Ratio of M2 to Foreign Exchange Reserves of 
the Central Bank 
 
IFS where available. 
Otherwise WDI 
PRIVATE/GDP Ratio of Domestic Credit to the Private Sector 
to GDP 
IFS 
CREDITGROWTH Rate of Growth of Real Domestic Credit IFS 
BANKREFORM EBRD Index Of Banking Sector Reform Selected Economic 
Indicators of EBRD 
FOREIGNLAG One Period Lagged Value of Asset Share of 
Foreign Banks (In Percent) 
Selected Economic 
Indicators of EBRD 
The dependet variable of our model is a dummy variable for crisis an it is equal to one 
if a country experienced a systemic banking crises at any point during the period of study as 
defined by Gerard Caprio and Daniella Kliengebiel (2003) and Luc Laeven and Valencia 
Fabian (2008), otherwise it is equal to zero. Table 2 shows crisis episodes as identified by 
Gerard Caprio and Daniella Kliengebiel (2003) and Luc Laeven and Valencia Fabian (2008). 
Table 2 
Banking Crises 
Country Crises Years Country Crises Years 
 Albania 1992-1997  Kyrgyz Republic 1990-1999 
 Armenia 1994-1996  Latvia 1995-1997 
 Azerbaijan 1995  Lithuania 1995-1996 
 Belarus 1995  Moldova 1994 
 Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 1992-2003  Montenegro  
 Bulgaria 1995-1997  Poland 1990-1999 
 Croatia 1996-1998  Romania 1990-1999 
 Czech Republic 1991-1995  Russia 1995;1998 
 Estonia 
1992-1995; 
1998  Slovak Republic 1991-2000 
 FYR Macedonia 
1993-1994; 
1997  Slovenia 1992-1994 
 Georgia 1991-1996  Serbia   
 Hungary 1991-1997  Tajikistan 1996 
 Kazakhstan 1991-1994  Ukraine 1997-1998 
 Macro Economic Variables 
GROWTH: is the Rate of Growth of Real GDP. Negative macroeconomic shocks 
deteriorate the balance sheets of banks and banks’ borrowers. The effects of adverse 
macroeconomic shocks on banking crises are captured by the rate of growth of real GDP. 
INTEREST: is Real Interest Rate. Real interest rate is calculated as  Nominal Interest 
Rate minus the Contemporaneous Rate of Inflation. Since one of the main functions of banks 
is maturity transformation, i.e. financing long term investments with short term borrowing, 
banks are subject to interest rate risk. One of the external macro economic conditions that 
have played a role in the banking crises especially in emerging markets is a sudden and sharp 
increase in world interest rates. A sharp rise in industrial country interest rates can curtail the 
flow of foreign funds to emerging markets and raise the cost of the foreign funds for domestic 
banks and firms. Thus, a large increase in short-term interest rates is likely to be a major 
source of systemic banking sector problems. 
INFLATION:  is the Rate of Change of the GNP Deflator. High inflation is associated 
with high net interest margins and profitability in the banking sector due to increase in the 
volume of banking transactions and banking activity as a result of high inflation. Hence, 
banking sectors of countries with a history of high inflation may face with problems after a 
successful stabilization program. On the other hand, a successful stabilization program also 
provides financial stability. Thus, in our model the expected sign for the coefficient on the 
rate of growth of inflation rate (the GNP deflator) is ambiguous. 
DEPRECIATION: is the Rate of Depreciation of Local Currency Against the US 
Dollar. The rate of depreciation of the local currency is used in the model in order to test the 
hypothesis that bank failure may be driven by foreign exchange risk. Exchange rate shifts and 
foreign currency loans have been a source of banking problems in almost all financial crises 
in emerging markets. Unexpected exchange rate depreciations can negatively affect the 
banking sector directly when banks have sizeable un-hedged foreign liabilities and/or there is 
a maturity mismatch between bank assets and liabilities.  Exchange rate depreciations can 
also indirectly affect the banking sector when large depreciation creates deterioration in the 
balance sheets of bank borrowers. 
SURPLUS/GDP: is the Ratio of Central Government Budget Surplus to GDP. 
Measures to be taken to deal with problems in the balance sheets of banking sector may be 
delayed due to the budgetary difficulties of the central government.  In turn, the initial 
problems may grow to systemic proportions and turn in to a full-fledged crisis. Thus, in our 
model the expected sign for the coefficient on the ratio of central government budget surplus 
to GDP is positive.  
Financial Variables 
CASH/BANK: is the Ratio of Bank Liquid Reserves to Bank Assets. If the banking 
system is illiquid and fragile, adverse macroeconomic conditions may affect bank balance 
sheets negatively and lead to banking crises. The ratio of bank cash and reserves to bank 
assets are used to capture liquidity in our model. The expected sign for the coefficient on the 
ratio of bank cash and reserves to bank assets is negative. 
M2/RESERVES: is The Ratio of M2 to Foreign Exchange Reserves of the Central 
Bank. The ratio of M2 to foreign exchange rate reserves is used to test bank vulnerability to 
sudden capital outflows. Reversal of capital inflows has similar effects as bank runs by 
domestic depositors. When foreign investors lose their confidence, they withdraw their funds 
unexpectedly and refuse to roll-over existing debt stock. As domestic banks are unable to roll 
over their debts that are falling due, they will try to restore their liquidity by calling in 
domestic credits and selling their assets at fire-sale prices. This leads to financial crises and 
systemic crises in the market.  
PRIVATE/GDP: is the Ratio of Domestic Credit to the Private Sector to GDP. In our 
model, the ratio of credit to the private sector to GDP is used to capture the extent to which 
financial liberalization has progressed. Inadequate preparation for financial liberalization has 
often preceded financial crises. Experiences of many countries indicates that the banking 
crises occurred in countries where inadequate internal controls and inadequate prudential 
regulation and supervision existed when financial liberalization took place. Deregulation of a 
financial system and rapid credit growth can be disastrous if banking institutions and their 
regulators do not have adequate expertise, resources and training to monitor and evaluate risk 
taking. In many of the countries that have experienced financial liberalization, a significant 
rise in bank lending and risk taking has been observed. 
CREDITGROWTH: is the Rate of Growth of Real Domestic Credit. Banking crises 
have often been preceded by both bank lending booms and boom-bust cycles. Lending 
booms, financed either by expansionary monetary and fiscal policies or large capital inflows, 
have often resulted in overinvestment in real assets, which leads to sharp rises in equity and 
real estate prices. Banks make loans to construction companies and the real estate sector since 
these sectors are thought to offer the best collateral. Initially, asset prices went up as 
borrowers bid up the price of real estate, and thus projects were seen as profitable. With this 
optimism, banks continue to over-lend to the projects. However, the debt servicing capacity 
of these sectors depends on continuous rise in property prices and strong demand, thereby 
creating vulnerability to an economic slowdown. A slowdown in economic growth may lead 
to a collapse of real estate market. When the bubble burst and real estate and equity prices 
decline sharply, banks face rising levels of non-performing loans and declining collateral 
values. 
Institutional Variables 
BANKREFORM: is the EBRD Index of Banking Sector Reform. Banking sector 
reform index is taken from EBRD which reports a yearly assessment of the level of banking 
restrictions in a country. The index ranges from 1 to 5 with higher values indicating greater 
restrictions. In constructing this index, EBRD considers the ease with which foreign banks 
can open branches and subsidiaries; government interference in the allocation of credit, 
including government ownership of banks; the ability of private banks to operate without 
government regulation such as deposit insurance; and the ability of banks to provide a wide 
range of financial services including real estate and securities transactions, and insurance. We 
would expect that countries that have experienced crises would have more restrictive banking 
environments. 
FOREIGNLAG: is the lag of Asset Share of Foreign Banks (in percent).  The 
relationship between foreign bank participation and banking crisis is ambiguous. On the one 
hand, the participation of foreign banks can enhance the stability of domestic banking and 
financial system through promoting the stability of the domestic deposit base, making 
banking systems more robust to adverse domestic or external shocks, stabilizing credit supply 
during a negative shock,  improving prudential supervision and regulation of the domestic 
financial system, and enhancing the transparency in the banking sector  and efficiency of the 
macroeconomic policies. On the other hand, foreign banks can bring financial instability 
through stimulating capital flight and importing shocks from their home countries or from 
other countries where they operate. The lagged value of the variable is used to account for 
any possible endogeneity problem. 
 
V. ESTIMATION RESULTS 
 
The main results of the econometric study are provided in Table 3. Table 3 presents 
the estimated coefficients for a number of alternative model specifications due to 
multicollinearity problems. The quality of the model specification is assessed based on 






















      
GROWTH -0.1708       -0.1397       0.1076       0.0124       0.2296       0.3622       
 0.1008     0.1192     0.1496       0.1115       0.1813      0.2434      
 [0.0903] [0.2410] [0.4721] [0.9109] [0.2054] [0.1367] 
INFLATION   0.0857       0.05903       0.0509       -0.1471       
   0.0465      0.0385      0.0881       0.15709      
   [0.0652] [0.1252] [0.5631] [0.3489] 
DEPRECIATION   0.0815       0.0545        0.1155       
   0.0251      0.0212       0.0742      
   [0.0012] [0.0101]  [0.1197] 
INTEREST     0.1459       0.0453       
     0.1015      0.1125       
     [0.1505] [0.6873] 
SURPLUS/GDP     -8.1770      -7.9732      
     14.7061      16.0018      
     [0.5782] [0.6183] 
Financial 
Variables 
      
PRIVATE/GDP -0.0121       -0.0134       -0.0183          
 0.0041     0.0048     0.0052        
 [0.0033] [0.0053] [0.0004]    
CREDITGROWTH -0.0040       -0.0031       -0.0065       -0.0042       -0.0119       -0.0314       
 0.0018     0.0016     0.0029     0.0021     0.0094     0.0186     
 [0.0316] [0.0629] [0.0275] [0.0490] [0.2065] [0.0906] 
CASH/BANK -
29.5790     
     
 14.6855          
 [0.0440]      
M2/RESERVES       0.0005       0.0009        0.0025       0.0043       
  0.0010       0.0015        0.0039       0.0056       
  [0.5930] [0.5155]  [0.5142] [0.4442] 
Institutional  
Variables 
      
FOREIGNLAG -0.0767       -0.0678       -0.0769       -0.0516       -0.0971       -0.1627       
 0.0154     0.0185     0.0200     0.0146     0.0432     0.0806     
 [0.0000] [0.0002] [0.0001] [0.0004] [0.0246] [0.0437] 
BANKREFORM  0.0666       -0.6647          
  0.8746       0.9893         
  [0.9392] [0.5017]    
Number of  
observations               
124 124 124 124 64 64 
Number of 
Countries 
11 11 11 11 7 7 
Log likelihood -23.813      -25.421      -16.545      -24.859      -9.610      -7.797      
AIC 28.8 31.4 24.5 29.8 16.6 15.7 
Note: Coefficient estimations are in bold-faces; standard deviations are in italic forms; p-


















      
GROWTH -0.042 -0.0349 0.0269 0.0030 0.0574 0.0905 
INFLATION   0.0214 0.0147 0.0127 -0.0367 
DEPRECIATION   0.0203 0.0136 0.0365 0.0288 
INTEREST      0.0113 
SURPLUS/GDP     -2.0442 -1.9933 
Financial 
Variables 
      
PRIVATE/GDP -0.003 -0.0033 -0.0045    
CREDITGROWTH -0.001 -0.0007 -0.0016 -0.0010 -0.0029  
CASH/BANK -7.394    0.0006 -0.0078 
M2/RESERVES       0.0001 0.0002   0.0010 
Institutional  
Variables 
      
FOREIGNLAG -0.019 -0.0169 -0.0192 -0.0129 -0.0242 -0.0406 
BANKREFORM  0.0166 -0.1661    
 
 
As shown by results in Table 3, GDP growth, inflation and depreciation variables are 
significant in some specifications. In regard to financial variables, while the ratio of M2 to 
reserves is not significant in all specifications, the ratio of domestic credit to the private 
sector to GDP and the ratio of bank liquid reserves to bank assets variables are significant in 
all models including these particular variables. On the other hand, the rate of growth of real 
domestic credit is significant in some specifications.  
The coefficient of the banking sector reform variable is insignificant in all models 
including this particular variable. Foreign bank participation variable has a significant and 
negative sign in all specifications. Thus, the presence of foreign banks appears to reduce the 
incidence of banking crisis. In terms of marginal effects, a one percentage point increase in 
foreign bank participation reduces the probability of banking crises in transition economies, 
at least by 1.29 percent and at most by 4.06, depending on the model examined. This result 
may be taken as evidence that the presence of foreign banks is preferable from the point of 
view of minimizing banking sector fragility. 
We have also estimated the model using the full sample but without fixed effects 
(pooled logit regression model) to confirm the robustness of our findings. The results remain 




Using a multivariate fixed effect logit econometric model and taking possible 
endogenity problem into account, we test the hypothesis that foreign bank participation 
contributes to decrease in banking crises in transition economies in 1990-2006. The sample 
includes 26 transition economies and the data is unbalanced. The obtained results proved to 
be robust to different model specifications, demonstrating that there is a negative relation 
between foreign bank presence and banking crisis in a country during the estimation period. 
Thus, the results suggest that foreign bank participation decreases the possibility of banking 
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Koristeći multivarijatni panelni logit ekonometrijski model s fiksnim učinkom i uzimajući u obzir 
mogući problem endogenosti, testirali smo hipotezu da participacija stranih banaka doprinosi 
smanjenju bankarskih kriza u tranzicijskim gospodarstvima u periodu od 1990-2006. Rezultati 
ukazuju na to da participacija stranih banaka umanjuje mogućnost za bankarske krize kontrolirajući 
ostale faktore koji takve krize mogu uzrokovati. Ovaj rad doprinosi literaturi tako što predstavlja prve 
empirijske dokaze negativnog odnosa stvarne razine prisustva stranih banaka (koncentracije stranih 
banaka) i bankarskih kriza u tranzicijskim gospodarstvima. 
 
Ključne riječi: financijske krize, banke, struktura kapitala i vlasništva, tranzicijska 
gospodarstva, panel istraživanje 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
